Brand rivalry, market segmentation and the pricing of optional engine power on automobiles.

This paper analyzes how the prices strategies for base automobile models may differ from those for premium models, sold with extra engine power. The popular monopoly model of market segmentation according to willingness to pay for quality is compared with two models of brand rivalry. In a first scenario, consumer are fully informed of all prices; in a second scenario, consumers are initially only informed about the prices of base models , due to selective price advertising strategies. Implications for the differences in markups between base models and premium models are drawn. These are tested with data on the European automobile market, using hedonic regression techniques. The evidence is consistent with the brand rivalry model under limited information, and inconsistent with the other two models.Automobiles; Pricing; Rivalries;

The internal economics of a university - evidence from personnel data

Based on a rich personnel data set of a large university we .nd strong evidence for the existence of an internal labor market. First, the lowest academic rank is a strong port of entry and the highest rank is a port of exit. Second, wages do not follow external wage developments, since they follow administrative rules that have not been modi.ed for a long time. We subsequently look at internal promotion dynamics to assess the relevance of alternative internal labor market theories. A unique feature of our data is that we have good measures of performance. Consistent with incentive theories of internal labor markets, research and teaching performance turn out to be crucial determinants of promotion dynamics. Learning theories of internal labor markets appear to have support when we do not account for observed performance, but the evidence becomes much weaker once we control for performance. Finally, we .nd that administrative rigidities play an important role in explaining promotion dynamics.

Market integration and convergence to the law of one price : evidence from the European car market.

This paper exploits the unique experiment of European market integration to investigate the relationship between integration and price convergence in international markets. Using a panel data set of car prices we examine how the process of integration has affected cross-country price dispersion in Europe. We find surprisingly strong evidence of convergence towards both the absolute and the relative versions of Purchasing Power Parity. Our analysis illuminates the main sources of segmentation in international markets and suggests the type of institutional changes that can successfully reduce it.Convergence; Integration; Law;

Nested logit or random coefficients logit? A comparison of alternative discete models of product differentiation.

We start from an aggregate random coefficients nested logit (RCNL) model to provide a systematic comparison between the tractable logit and nested logit (NL) models with the computationally more complex random coefficients logit (RC) model. We first use simulated data to assess possible parameter biases when the true model is a RCNL model. We then use data on the automobile market to estimate the different models, and as an illustration assess what they imply for competition policy analysis. As expected, the simple logit model is rejected against the NL and RC model, but both of these models are in turn rejected against the more general RCNL model. While the NL and RC models result in quite different substitution patterns, they give robust policy conclusions on the predicted price effects from mergers. In contrast, the conclusions for market definition are not robust across different demand models. In general, our findings suggest that it is important to account for sources of market segmentation that are not captured by continuous characteristics in the RC model.

Vertical control of a distribution network - an empirical analysis of magazines

How does an upstream firm determine the size of its distribution network, and what is the role of vertical restraints? To address these questions we develop and estimate two models of outlet entry, starting from the basic trade-o¤ between market expansion and fixed costs. In the coordinated entry model the upstream firm sets a market-specific wholesale price to implement the first-best number of outlets. In the restricted/free entry model the upstream firm has insufficient price instruments to target local markets. It sets a uniform wholesale price, and restricts entry in markets where market expansion is low, while allowing free entry elsewhere. We apply the two models to magazine distribution. The evidence is more consistent with the second model where the upstream firm sets a uniform wholesale price and restricts the number of entry licenses. We use the model to assess the profitability of modifying the vertical restraints. A government ban on restriced licensing would reduce profits by a limited amount, so that the business rationale for restricted licensing should be sought elsewhere. Furthermore, introducing market-specific wholesale prices would implement the first-best, but the profit increase would be small, providing a rationale for the current uniform wholesale prices.

The evolution of markets under entry and standards regulation - the case of global mobile telecommunication.

We analyze the effects of government policies on the evolution of an industry, the global mobile telecommunications market. We find a relatively slow diffusion convergence between countries. This follows partly from regulatory delay in issuing first licenses, yet persisting initial cross-country differences also contribute to a lack of convergence. Introducing competition has a strong immediate impact on diffusion, but a weak impact afterwards; sequential entry is preceded by pre-emptive behavior by incumbents. This is consistent with the presence of consumer switching costs. Setting a single technological standard accelerates the diffusion of analogue technologies considerably; for digital technologies it is too early to draw reliable conclusions, yet the available evidence suggests that setting single standards has similar beneficial effects.Competition; Costs; Effects; Industry; Convergence;

Liberalizing a distribution system: The European car market.

We quantify the competitive effects of removing vertical restraints, based on the recent proposals to liberalize the selective and exclusive distribution system in the European car market. We estimate a differentiated products demand system for new cars and specify a model of oligopoly pricing under the current distribution regime. We then perform several policy experiments: the creation of international intrabrand competition (cross-border trade) and a possible strenghtening of national intrabrand competition. Our approach may also be useful to assess the competitive effects of vertical restraints in other applications.Distribution; Market; Effects; Proposals; Oligopoly; Applications;

Exclusive dealing as a barrier to entry? Evidence from automobiles.

Exclusive dealing contracts between manufacturers and retailers force new entrants to set up their own costly dealer networks to enter the market. We ask whether such contracts may act as an entry barrier, and provide an empirical analysis of the European car market. We first estimate a demand model with product and spatial differentiation, and quantify the role of a dense distribution network in explaining the car manufacturers’ market shares. We then perform policy counterfactuals to assess the pro.t incentives and entry-deterring effects of exclusive dealing. We find that there are no individual incentives to maintain exclusive dealing, but there can be a collective incentive by the industry as a whole, even absent efficiencies. Furthermore, a ban on exclusive dealing would shift market shares from the larger European firms to the smaller entrants. More importantly, consumers would gain substantially, mainly because of the increased spatial availability and less so because of intensified price competition. Our findings suggest that the European Commission’s recent decision to facilitate exclusive dealing in the car market may not have been warranted.

Participation and schooling in a public system of higher education.

We analyze the determinants of participation (whether to study) and schooling (where and what to study) in a public system of higher education, based on a unique dataset of all eligible high school pupils in an essentially closed region (Flanders). We .nd that pupils perceive the available institutions and programs as close substitutes, implying an ambiguous role for travel costs: they hardly aspect the participation decisions, but have a strong impact on the schooling decisions. In addition, high school background plays an important role in both the participation and schooling decisions. To illustrate how our empirical results can inform the debate on reforming public systems, we assess the effects of tuition fee increases. Uniform cost-based tuition fee increases achieve most of the welfare gains; the additional gains from fee di¤erentiation are relatively unimportant. These welfare gains are quite large if one makes conservative assumptions on the social cost of public funds, and there is a substantial redistribution from students to outsiders.

Reducing product diversity in higher education.

Public systems of higher education have recently attempted to cut costs by providing financial incentives to institutions who reduce the diversity of their programs. We study the profit and welfare effects of reducing product diversity in higher education, against the background of a funding system reform in Flanders (Belgium). We find that dropping duplicated programs at individual institutions tends to be socially undesirable, due to the limited fixed cost and variable cost savings and the students’ low willingness to travel to other institutions. Furthermore, we find that the financial incentives offered to drop programs may be very ineffective, leading to both undesirable reform and undesirable status quo. These findings emphasize the complexities in regulating product diversity in higher education, and serve as a word of caution towards the various decentralized financial incentive schemes that have recently been introduced.Participation; Product; Diversity;